Oliver A. Houck, professor, Tulane Law School
New Orleans Times-Picayune
February 29, 1996

Watching the Freeport-McMoRan-in-Indonesia story unfold, I am impressed not only by what we've learned about the mine in Irian Jaya (West Papua) but also by what we've learned about ourselves. Now that the dust has at least temporarily settled, let me offer a few conclusions.

1. Corporate donations are not free. They buy loyalty. Virtually every institution in town to which Freeport has contributed has rushed to press to protest Freeport's innocence. They spoke before anything more than the barest first facts were on the table.

This phenomenon is not new. Two years ago, Freeport and Louisiana's Department of Environmental Quality were embarrassed by a National Geographic article on pollution of the Lower Mississippi River. A few days later, a little-known local educational society published a remarkable letter in this newspaper defending Freeport and Louisiana industry. The society, it turns out, was supported by Freeport funding. Its letter apparently established a pattern: the instant testimonial for donor.

The Freeport operation in Irian Jaya (West Papua) was first reported last summer in The Nation. Shortly thereafter, I received a copy of a letter apparently drafted by professors at the University of New Orleans criticizing the article and defending Freeport's record. To its credit, the letter disclosed that the named professors were under contract to Freeport.

If authentic, it revealed a very human reaction: Once you receive major money from A, you are no longer defending A to the general public; from then on, you are defending yourself.

This syndrome blossomed fully in the wake of the OPIC letter canceling Freeport's insurance in Irian Jaya (West Papua). Within days, we had heard from the chancellor of UNO ($1.6 million from Freeport), the dean of its College of Business Administration (a smaller Freeport grant), the president of Loyola ($600,000), U.S. Rep. Billy Tauzin and U.S. Sen. John Breaux (contributions undisclosed), among others, attacking OPIC's action and supporting Freeport.

Two dozen local institutions receiving money from Freeport, including Tulane University ($1.25 million), took out a full-page ad praising Freeport's environmental record. A UNO department under contract to Freeport held a meeting on the issue with no outside students or college newspaper allowed. Loyola's president went a step farther and encouraged Freeport not to attend a colloquium on the subject organized by Loyola faculty and hinted at disciplining student protesters.

The problem is not the people or institutions, which are among the finest in the city. The problem is the influence on them of major money. They were suddenly not in the business of open inquiry and the search for truth. They were into self-defense.

2. Nor are the media beyond influence. Freeport's first reaction to media criticism has been to buy it. During the controversy over Freeport's gypsum dumping proposal here in the mid-1980s, its most vocal and respected media critic was Garland Robinette, then anchor of WWL Channel 4. Freeport hired Garland Robinette. Criticism of Freeport continued from Gerard Braud of WDSU Channel 6. Freeport hired Gerard Braud.

When the Indonesia story broke, Freeport flew Austin (Texas) American-Statesman reporter William Collier from Austin to Irian Jaya (West Papua), and then hired him, too. Freeport has dangled similar offers before reporters of The Times-Picayune.

Freeport has also purchased deeply into the media business. The WYES Channel 12 program "Informed Sources" featuring the week's local news is sponsored by Freeport; to my knowledge it has yet to discuss the events surrounding the Freeport mine.

Freeport has also contributed $15,000 to our other public television station, WLAE Channel 32. When the OPIC story broke, WLAE offered to broadcast a 28-minute Freeport "infomercial" as an "educational special" and allowed Freeport to produce it free of charge at the station's publicly supported studios. The station has thus far not agreed to air a response by human rights and environmental organizations.

The greatest influence exercised by Freeport over the media on its Indonesia operations has been the simple matter of access. Perhaps the most disingenuous complaint from the many Freeport spokesmen who have written to The Times-Picayune is the recent letter of its public affairs manager in Indonesia saying that most reporters do not take the time to visit and research their stories on the scene. The fact is that nobody visits Freeport's operations in Indonesia without, at the very least, Freeport's permission.

Channel 4 newsman Bill Elder was recently denied entry to film the story by the Indonesian government. I am told that Freeport's permission for Mr. Elder's entry was contingent on his agreement to be accompanied by Freeport escorts and to use only Freeport cameras and equipment. When you have taken an independent Channel 4 out of the picture, you have affected a lot of media coverage in the New Orleans area.

In all the media coverage of this affair we have seen, there are, oddly, few statements from researchers and others who have been openly critical of Freeport's operations. Some of them have received letters from the company threatening legal action. One wonders if the media received these same communications.

When Freeport has bought up news reporters, bought into the public media, restricted access by commercial media and threatened critics with lawsuits, one is left to wonder exactly what a Freeport-endowed university chair in "environmental communications" really means.

3. Looking at the Irian Jaya (West Papua) mine and the wasted river that carries its discharge to the sea, it seems obvious that no company could have gotten away with this kind of operation in the United States. Our standards for water quality would have prevented it, and our environmental impact review process would in all probability have surfaced a better alternative: pretreatment, for example, or a pipeline for the tailings. My guess is that we'd have allowed at least some of the mining and required restoration, saving the river.

The question becomes, why not do this in Indonesia? One argument is that all American companies need to do is comply with (lower) Indonesian standards. That view was taken in Louisiana for many years. Since then, Louisiana has found out what other developing countries are finding: environmental harm will out, and when it does, we are into major damage control, cleanup costs and image repair.

Had the company been thinking pro-actively, as it would have had to in the United States, the river, forests and human culture that occupied them could well have been spared.