From: pavo@worldaccess.nl, Grace Roembiak 

Foundation Study & Information 
Papuan Peoples
P.O. Box 801
3500 AV Utrecht
The Netherlands
ph: +31. 30 23 22 809
fax: +31. 30 24 00 839
email: pavo@worldaccess.nl

The following remarks about the 1% offer were written by Brother Theo van den Broek, a spokesman for the Catholic Church in Irian Jaya (West Papua). He is an assistant to the Bishop of Jayapura, whose diocese covers the whole of Irian Jaya (West Papua).

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KANTOR KEUSKUPAN JAYAPURA               TEL:+62-967-33092
KOTAK POS 1379                          FAX:+62-967-36427
JAYAPURA 99013, INDONESIA
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TIMIKA-NOTES I (revised)        NO. 464/TB/96/8.3.      Jayapura, 2-6-1996
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I. Moffett's offer

1. First of all it should be noted that the offer has been made public in a meeting where the Army was in charge and the local population present among other officials from the government as well from the Freeport Company. While the meeting was going on four army helicopters, completely armed, were continuously circling above the place of the gathering at Timika. For sure not the best atmosphere to start an open dialogue. During the meeting the message of Moffett has been read and the presentation has been completed by speeches by the governor and ex-governor of Irian Jaya (West Papua) and some other officials. There hasn't been any chance for a reaction by the local people or their representatives. A second meeting that was held at the mining town, Tembagapura, was attached by local people representatives as well and there has been given a chance for some dialogue, which according to the reports was quite heated.

2. Second the contents of the message was the result of a processes in two main steps: (1) some initial hard work by Freeport officials together with the Provincial Government Planning Office in Jayapura, and (2) some corrections by the Central Government in Jakarta. By the correcting step some very clear items in the original draft have been weakened, as f.i. in the original (Irian Jaya (West Papua)-) draft the trust fund was clearly connected with the Amungme and Kamoro people only; in the final (Jakarta-) draft these specification has been replaced by "local people" (item 4 in the text); similar changes have been made on some points. Another clear change has been made at item 8, where the original draft put very clearly that "FIC will provide the needed funds to investigate the alleged human rights abuses", while the official final text puts the whole item in conditional terms.

3. A third remark concerns the fact that the contents of the message hasn't been immediately understood by the local population; the language used is too complicated for the local people to understand the real contents quickly. A lot of accent has been put on the "1%-offer" without specifying its real meaning, without explaining that the money made available will be partly (the largest) used for a number of programs which are already in place (item 1-4).

4. Fourthly, a letter of refusal on the offer has been sent to Mr. Moffett the same night (the 13th April) by Tom Beanal, which presents a short note expressing the feeling being misused and cheated, and which ends with a post-scription note which says: "till we meet in New Orleans" (in fact already referring to the upcoming law-suit). The letter can be seen as a personal one and signed on his own behalf only.

5. Fifth, in the discussions (among others including: Tom Beanal, LEMASA, Church representative and local Freeport Officials) the days following the announcement, it became clear that the whole atmosphere in which the Moffett-message as been delivered was not very helpful, and that the population was very confused about what really has been offered. A lot of explanation have been given and the bits of information which were most stressed started to have a life on their own, developing in misinterpretations and false expectations. Partly, that situation is still relevant. What became clear as well was the fact that the message hasn't solved anything for the time being. If Freeport-New Orleans is informing the people in USA that a final agreement with the local people has been reached, I have been suggested in the media in the States as a symbolic seal on the deal, the reality shows a different world in which Ibu Yosepha tells Mr. Moffett that after hearing the offer by Moffett she still has the feeling that her bag is still empty! At least that is what shows up in almost all the reports I have listened to the days after the meeting at the 13th.

6. Sixth, a very sensitive and for the local people difficult point is that composition of the team that will be in charge of deciding on what should be done wit the 1% made available by Freeport. From one point of view the basic idea is not bad as it aims for a wide representation of parties involved in the development of the area; but from the other point of view the local population feels that too much power is given to the local government, and therefore they fear that they will have hardly any say in the decisions. This feeling is still strengthened by the fact that the local government looked ready to start the team-work (spending the money) in a very close future, while the local people was still struggling to understand the message given to them. The effect is that once again things will be set up (the formation of the team) by outside people as the local people is not yet ready. Focusing on this very aspect the fundamental weakness of the whole processes becomes clear. The group working on the original draft (which made the mistake not to involve any of the local people in drafting the basic answer) had in mind to make the 13th as the very start of al long processes of dialoguing and slowly moving to more substantial ideas and way of handling the expected funds (which in the meantime could be put in the bank for interest). In reality this processes has been killed at the very moment that the deliverance of the message has been presented as a final answer. It is not surprising that in the first official meeting (21 May if I remember well) nothing has been reached as the meeting has been used by the local people to voice their dissatisfaction with the whole matter; the local people just claimed that the money should be handed over to them to be handled in their own way, as the money is the result of their struggle, and not of the struggle of the government, which in their eyes has been strikingly absent over all the years. The weakest point in the whole affair is that once again the local people has been bypassed in the most determining decisions, and they start expressing that very clearly. Above that they interpret the funds made available to them by Freeport as their right, and therefore should be handled by them and by nobody else.

7. Seventh. A last disturbing element is that during the waiting=period of thirty days (between the riots and the Moffett-message) a number of local people (31 local leaders) have been invited by Mr. Prabowo (Head of the special military troops) to Jakarta to explain their grieves and hopes. It is not clear what has been the motivation behind this move as the 31 people selected hardly cover the real people and real leaders involved. Above that a number of the selected 'leaders' have been directly involved in the riots. Back from Jakarta these people claim to be real leaders as they "are recognised by Jakarta". This element has results in quite some confusion among the local people and hinders them to present themselves and act as a unity. This weakness has also a lot of impact f.i. on the procedure to select the people who should be representing the local people in the "1% development team".

Conclusion: the Moffett-message is all but a seal on a final mutual agreement on the one hand, and a real good chance to start a substantial dialogue has been missed. The local people has been made more aware about the situation on one hand but has been weakened by internal divisions on the other.

II. The law suit

1. First of all it should be clear that the law-suit was not something that just has popped up out of the blue. The remark in Tom Beanal's letter of the 13th April is sufficient prove for that. Talks about a possible law suit have been held since some months, but no final decision was made by them.

2. Second, the law suit has been filed by the firm after receiving an authentic authorisation to do so signed by Tom Beanal; in the authorisation ample space has been given to the law firm to act on his behalf and to take all the necessary steps (including timing and formulating the text of the law suit). >From that point of view there seems to be no procedural problem. The timing of the law suit is for sure connected up with the previous knowledge about the share-holders meeting that was planned for the 30 of April. The text has not been send to Tom Beanal before it was filed; I guess it would have been fair to do let him read the text first, but the short time the firm had to come up with the text on the day before the shareholders meeting, made that kind of dialogue virtually impossible. Above that the firm opted for a surprise, I guess (and that is a matter of strategy).

3. Third, Tom's decision to file the suit has been a very decision, and hardly any of his direct associates on the spot (Timika) has been informed about it before. At the end informing 'his people', Tom got a number of reactions by his own folks which made him doubting about the step he had already taken, and this has resulted in a withdrawal letter some days later.

4. Fourth. For a number of people the change of attitude on Tom's part has been a matter of puzzling. To put it simple: they have the feeling that today he can sign a letter of co-operation and tomorrow he can act completely against it. This duality in his attitude has been questioned by people who support him as well as by people who like to put him down. The same question can be asked when Tom states that till now nothing has been done by Freeport for the benefit of the local people, while he must be aware about a number of programs in place. i personally only can understand his attitude by distinguishing two levels of feeling and experience. The one is the deep feeling and experience that Freeport has taken away the land, has exploited it, and has turned it into a devastated landscape; and all this without really respecting the local owner in his existence, his rights, his beliefs and his emotions. This fact has made an incurable wound. He (Tom) feels this pain all over and never can get rid of it; it is fundamental and basic in all the reactions. The other feeling is brought along with the awareness that things have been done, and help been given, and even the fact that some people in the Freeport Company circle deserve to be personally respected. He (Tom) is clever enough to see this and to understand that his part of the coin can help him and his people to improve their fate relatively. But this part of the feeling can not complete really with the more basic one mentioned before. Both worlds of feeling express themselves in "singing contradictory letters" or in acting in an (for an outsider) inconsistent way. Above that often the trend of the talks is: let we take what we can get now! and anyway we can not change the situation! and things have been done so we better make the best out of it now! That kind of an attitude is really boosted by the still vague "1% offer". Add to it that people like Tom are very hard to find, which means that there is hardly a chance for someone like him to have 'the same kind of educated' people around to have a real good creative discussion with when it comes to difficult issues and policy-matters. In this kind of a situation we shouldn't be surprised about the duality shown. The duality is 'logic' enough, and it is better to keep in mind that the real questions and feelings can not be answered by "any money". Any offer for a solution which is connected with the "world of today's improvement" can make sense, but never will answer the "world of hurt" that is registrated in the heart of this people (and generations to come) and its representatives. What is needed is the restore of pride, the restore of and recognition of real rights, the real recognition that local people has an indisputable right to exist and to claim its rights connected with it. This will be the heart of the matter in any law suit; publicity fighting in that way might help to restore a bit of the loss. At least that is the way I understand the dualistic acting as shown by Tom.

Theo van den Broek

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KANTOR KEUKUPAN JAYAPURA KOTAK POS 1379 JAYAPURA 99013, INDONESIA ______________________________________________________________ TIMIKA-NOTES II (revised) NO.609/tb/96/8.3.Jayapura, 14-8-1996 ______________________________________________________________

Notes made after the visit to Timika: 7-10 August 1996

(1) GENERAL CONFUSION ABOUT WHAT IS AT STAKE

The situation including the attitude taken by the local people is very complex. This has been partly caused by the fact various elements of "solution" have been alowly mixed up completely; this happened partly because of the used language (including the way matters have been presented by various parties), partly because of rel change in the issues, so nobody knows anymore what they are really dealing with. There are at least four different elements:

the 1% offer the one time 500 million gift to seven tribes the land-settlement the 75 million donation

1.1. Concerning the 1% offer

1.1.1. It becomes more and more clear that de facto the 1% is an additional funds inject by PT Freeport to the government's regional development program. When it was presented at the meeting of the 13 April at Timika, it was spontaneously picked up as a kind of direct offer by PT Freeport to the local population, in the meaning that it could be claimed by the local people. For a careful reader -but only for him/her- it was clear that the people only could benefit of it by participating in the "program implementation team" (PIU), and that the funds would be handled under direct authority of the local government. But as the formulation of this element wasn't directly clear to people, it is not surprising that the people really started protesting as soon as it became indeed clear to them that the money facto would be handed over to the government for handling. In this case "handling" means ideally: taking care of a proper decision making process deciding on the contents of that decision at the end PT Freeport would give the final clearance. Till the factual release the funds will be saved at a special Bank-Account.

1.1.2. As a contribution to the local government budget the 1% offer was not more than a factual continuation of the agreement already reached between the government and PT Freeport shortly before the actual rioting in March. Looked at it in that perspective it hardly can be valued as an answer to the demands put forward in the aftermath of the rioting; what was planned before the riots, and agreed on between the Government and PT Freeport, was a more obvious involvement of the local government supported by PT Freeport made available funds. This agreement has been reformulated after the riots giving it a more "bottom-up" operational construction, stressing the role expected to be plaid by the local people in the decision making (about the actual use of the PT Freeport made available funds). As such the already reached decision/agreement (before the riots) has only been adjusted to an actual critical and demanding setting.

1.1.3. What will be actually funded via the 1% fund? As far as the information is available, it can be concluded that the fund mainly serves the implementation of the PWT2 (Program Pembangunan Wilayah Timika Terpadu) or ITD (Integrated Timika Development Plan) dealing with 17 "desa's" - administrative villages- in the area. The programs that will be decided on in the PIU (Program Implementation Unit), a board of representatives made up by all the involved parties. Besides that a part of the 1% fund will be used for (1) program and capital costs of the Basic Skills Development Centre, (2) medical care costs for treatment of local people who are not employees of the Company, -about 4 million US$ a year- (3) costs associated with the operation of the Business Incubator Program as far as it is continued -will be very limited-, (4) the Irian Jaya (West Papua) (college and high school-) Scholarship Program, -roughly 1 million US$ a year- and (5) the one time gift of 500 million rupiahs to the various (seven) tribes - roughly 1,5 million US$-.

1.2. Concerning the one time gift of 500 million Rupiah

1.2.1. The 500 million gift is something that has come up at the moment the local people protested clearly (during meetings around 21 and 26 of May) about the fact that the 1% would be handed over to the government to handle the funds; the population claimed it as their money, and not the government's and therefore the money should be handed over to them. To sweet the pill at the end the government (Bappenas) went along with the fact that an amount would be paid to all the tribes concerned, which came to 500 million rupiahs each (total of Rp. 3.500.000.000). This special one time gift is taken off from the 1%.

1.2.2. Agreement mentioned above has been more officially reached during meetings in Jakarta between two Amungme people -Andreas Anggaibak and Victor Beanal- and Bappenas; it is not clear who exactly requested for the meeting, but what is clear the meetings were arranged by the ex-head of the security of Timika, Bp. Alex, and sponsored by PT Freeport.

1.2.3. There is still a special tricky aspect as it comes to this 500 million gift, as it meant to be a gift to every tribe neighboring the PT Freeport project area. What has not been specified is: who would be supposed to use this money? the tribe, neighboring the PT Freeport project area. What has not been specified is: who should be supposed to use this money? the tribe people in the Timika area? or for all the members of the tribe, whether they live in Timika or else? This is a very practical issue, and the confusion around it, only will heathen the discussion and potentially lead to more internal divisions.

1.2.4. For instance, the organisation which has been given the right to receive the 500 million, should be an official legal body. This 'official legal body' has -in several cases- been formed by some members of the tribe all living in Timika and surroundings; f.i. this is the case of the organisation that will represent the Ekagi-tribe; above that all the places in the board are filled in by these same people; in the meantime members of the tribe living elsewhere start asking questions...-interested as they are as well in the gift which is meant to "be at the benefit of the tribe".

1.3. Concerning the land use agreement.

1.3.1. The "land-agreement" (the trust fund-concept) as such is a separate one and should be concluded with every tribe as such, as far as their traditional land is at stake; the first one was/is planned to be concluded with the Amungme-Kamoro as they are the traditional owners of the land in use. A draft (the latest one I know of; beginning of August 1996) of the agreement is still open for further discussion among the concerned parties; that means also that it is official not necessarily connected up with the 1% offer. There are reports that efforts have been made to make the people sign the agreement at the moment the 1% issue was officially concluded. That effort failed, but as far as I understand the "land-agreement issue" is still open while the 1% program" (at least as PT Freeport is concerned)has been settled for and will go ahead.

1.3.2. The PWT2 program (supported by the 1% funds) is meant to be an effort between the local people, the government and PT Freeport. The land-agreement is a bi-literal effort between PT Freeport and the specific tribes whose land PT Freeport is impacting. PT Freeport has told the local tribal leaders to study the draft, explain it to their other tribal elders, seek outside advice, and finally to find themselves a lawyer of their choosing to advice them while the costs involved will be paid by PT Freeport has told the local tribal leaders to study the draft, explain it to their other tribal elders, seek outside advice, and finally to find themselves a lawyer of their choosing to advise them while the costs involved will be paid by PT Freeport for th first 5 million Rps. of the legal fees.

1.3.3. Really confusing for 'normal people', but it will be denied by concerned parties, I guess, that the land-agreement has been conditional to the 1% offer. The only fact that can not be denied is that the funds for the 'land-agreement' would be originally taken of from the 1% fund: that construction has been left in a later -now offered by PT Freeport- concept where the funds needed for the "land-agreement" are clearly mentioned as coming on top of the 1% commitment.

1.4. Concerning the 75 million Rupiahs donation.

1.4.1. This is a minor element among the four elements mentioned above, i.e. the donation of 75 million rupiahs to respectively LEMASKO and LEMASA. The donation of this amount is less known as it was a practical and momentary help handed out by PT Freeport to support both organisations to organise themselves 'physically' (office, furniture and such) so they would be in a more decent position to do their job. LEMASKO has used the money to rent an office, while the money in name of LEMASA is still not cashed because of internal difficulties.

(2) ACCEPTANCE OF THE VARIOUS OFFERS.

2.1.1. Although it might have been very confusing in the reporting in the press, it can be said that a first document of acceptance has been signed on the 26 of May; signed by three people, Fedelis Zongonao as Chairman of AMEDDK (a development -program organisation in which a number of tribes are represented), Andreas Anggaibak as chairman of LEMASA (represents mainly the Amungme), and Silvester Kumuyu, signing for C. Amadeyau as Chairman of LEMASKO (represents the Kamoro). In the agreement the three chairman claim to speak on behalf of the people, a claim that is still open for discussion. Besides the three signatures there are three other signatures representing witnesses: respectively: Dandim Fakfak, Danpos Maleo, and Asintel Kasdam VIII Trikora.

2.1.2. Whatever the real worth of the mentioned agreement, LEMASA via its statement of 29 June 1996 makes clear that it refuses the 1% claiming as well to speak on behalf of the people (especially Amungme), while making clear at the same time that Andreas Anggaibak didn't have the position (nor the authority) to sign a agreement involving LEMASA (referring to the 26 May agreement). This statement of the 29th June is followed on the 12th of July by an official resolution by LEMASA to "terminate", effective immediately, Andreas Anggaibak as a member of LEMASA Board of Directors-Regents".

2.1.3. With that a split off of the Anggaibak-group from LEMASA has been sealed. It is hard to be determined how much backing both groups have, although it looks like that LEMASA has more popular support than the Anggaibak-group. It might be true as well that a large group is sitting on the sideline waiting to see what is going to happen. The support for the respective sides is connected as well with various issues. It might be true that Andreas has acted while motivated by quite personal reasons; above that he backed by the government and other authorities in place, while he officially a policeman, in which position he got a career-promotion in June/July 1996.

2.1.4. In this context a special general comment should be kept in mind concerning representation, or recognised leadership. According to some talks I had recently, I understand that representation (or the right to represent) is very closely connected up with who is traditionally owning the land that is at stake. In that perspective Andreas has hardly any base to act on, as he comes originally from the eastern Amungme area, which is not the project-area of PT Freeport, while Tom Beanal (a.o. representing LEMASA's refusal) is originally from the western Amungme area which coincides with the Freeport project area. This means that also for "outsiders" (neighboring tribal people from outside the Amungme area) it is tradition-wise more logical to jin in with Tom Cs than with Andreas Cs, as in Andreas' case there isn't really anything (any land or the demands which go along with it)at stake. It might be (carefully however) concluded that from that perspective the "people power" of the Andreas group is and will be very limited, unless other parties with formal (political or economical) power interfere or act on his behalf.

2.1.5. Besides the refusal as well as the acceptance within the Amungme group, the Kamoro group is reported to have accepted the 1% fund. And from the side of PT Freeport it is reported that they are determined to go ahead with the Integrated Timika Development Plan (involving the 1% support) under the authority of the local government. PT Freeport values it as "fact of life".

2.1.6. The attitude of refusal from the side of LEMASA can be connected with fact that a lawsuit is filed against PT Freeport by some people privately but connected up with LEMASA. As long as the 1% offer has been interpreted "as a kind of deal" with the local population (including the traditional landowners of the project area) LEMASA fears that by accepting the 1% it helps implicitly creating the impression that all the problems are solved, that there is 'a deal'; for LEMASA (or at least a number of people -more than 2000 signatures- represented by LEMASA), that is not the case. LEMASA tries to avoid the situation that by accepting some "presents" the real problems will not be dealt with: the problem of land-rights, the problem of environment damage and the problem of human rights violations in the past. It even looks like, -but this completely my own personal impression- that if the 1% from the very beginning had been presented as just a deal between the government and PT Freeport for supporting the regional development plan, even LEMASA could have get along with it, while keeping up its struggle concerning the basic matters as mentioned. But as it is presented as, and via the representation in PIU also mean to be, an offer directly to the people concerned, it can not be accepted by LEMASA for obvious reasons.

2.2. Concerning the one time gift.

2.2.1. On 11th of July the Kamoro have received the 500 million gift via the Yayasan Kamoro, while on the 17th of July 500 million has been handed over to Andreas Anggaibak representing the Yayasan Amungkal (450 million in cheque, while 50 million in cash). Other tribes are still reluctant to receive the donation (the Ekagi-tribe) or have not yet concluded the processing of a legal body to represent them (Dani, Nduga, Damal and Moni).

2.2.2. LEMASA has clearly refused the donation and has on several occasions (mainly in meetings on the 18th and the 26th of July) voiced its opinion that the money should be given back; this has been especially expressed in front of the Pembantu-Bupati (Head of the local Government) and in presence of the local military commander (of Kopassus) during the mass-meeting at the 18th of July, the day after the donation had been handed over to Andreas Anggaibak. LEMASA refuses the donation as "a gift to the tribe"; if given to Mr. Andreas Anggaibak as a personal present, it is okay with them.

2.2.3. The refusal of the one time gift should be seen in connection with the intention of LEMASA to handle the problems in a constitutional way, which concretely means via the lawsuit that is still filed and on process in the United States. Indeed it doesn't make that much sense to accept a donation and at the same time filling a lawsuit against the donating party.

2.3. Concerning the trust fund/agreement on land use.

2.3.1. The agreement that is looked for is very basic and dealt with in terms of a trust fund. What is aimed for, is a mutual understanding and agreement on the presents and rights of the local people as well as the presence and rights of the local people as well as the presence and room operate for PT Freeport. The compensation at stake for the people (concretely for the Amungme and Kamoro people together) is a yearly dividend (about US$ 500.000 yearly for 1996) and a position in the General Shareholders Meeting (owning 443 shares).

2.3.2. The idea of such a deal has been brought up since almost a year, but it looks like it demands still quite some discussions to get the idea completely worked out and understood, and to reach acceptable terms for both parties involved. For the time being it has been rejected by LEMASA. According to PT Freeport sources: PT Freeport "is not in a rush to conclude this. When they are ready, we will be ready".

2.3.3. The element of a trust fund should get some real attention;and especially the first one to be concluded with the Amungme-Kamoro group needs a lot of thought as it will function as a model in the future dealing with other tribes whose traditional land is at stake when PT Freeport expands its project area. It is a very principal matter, and any forced -in one way or an other- solution (agreement) will only backfire in due time. It is not clear how open the issue factually is, and in how far the people will be allowed room and authority to act without being overruled by government/army.

(3) TENSION AND INTIMIDATION

3.1. According to a number of stories intimidation is taking place over the last couple of weeks, and the most explicit form of it are letters spread around which try to discredit Tom Beanal Cs (indirectly LEMASA), while stating that "the people" likes to go ahead with development, and that Tom is hindering them to do so. He is warned to change his attitude or to face that (I quote) "we ('people eager to go for development') will put him on trial in our own way". The letters are written in a language which hardly can be found among the local people. But no doubt that intimidation is one of the instruments used to make people switching sides or just to scare them off and make them just silent.

3.2. A very recent and very disturbing fact is that documents concerning the lawsuit have been "stolen" from the LEMASA office on the 13 of August, and have found their way through the military to the police. The request to give them back to the legal owner has been refused.

(4) LEGAL ORGANISATIONS/FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR ROLE.

4.1. It might clear that PT Freeport has an agreement, but it is mainly an agreement with the government (backed by the Army). They have no agreement with the people, as only certain elements are voicing their agreement (Andreas Cs); others voice their refusal (mainly involving a legal representative organisation which is LEMASA). As LEMASA didn't get along, Foundation AMUNGkal has been set up by a small group of people, lead by Andreas; it is not clear at all how many people is represented by it.

4.2. So, I would be careful in using terms "a split within LEMASA". It looks more as if LEMASA has taken a direction which includes the refusal of the 1%. At the same time LEMASA is backing up the lawsuit in the States and as long as she is doing this, she can (logically) not accept any 'present' by PT Freeport. Others (Andreas Cs) think that the 1% for development should be accepted, and as there is no room for that within the structures of LEMASA they have set up a Foundation to do so. They were asked to set up that Foundation to be able to receive the money. The demand/condition to set up a new Foundation "in order to have a legal body the money can be transferred to" is as such a bit strange as LEMASA had and has an official and government recognised status. The new /additional Foundation is therefore of a complete other order, as it is not a Foundation representing the tradition views and authorities, but a Foundation for just pragmatic reasons; in position to accept projects supported by the 1% funds as well as to accept the one time gift of 500 million.

I like to stress this difference mentioned above between "a representative organisation" and "just a pragmatic one", as it is very important in understanding the role of the various organisations which are now taking part in the game.

4.3. The pragmatism is very evident when looked at the Foundation which have been set up or used to make the money available for the benefiting parties. Example: the 500 million for the Kamoro has been channeled via Foundation Kamoro which is not more or less than a private organisation with a legal status, which main goal is to have a legal base to accept projects (which means: project-money); the Foundation already existed at the moment the new demand (to have a special Foundation) was put forward as a condition; the Foundation is privately run by one of the main actors in the general Foundation LEMASKO (which as such is meant to be first of all a representative organisation).

4.4. Above that the whole process of the formation of Foundations for the special purpose mentioned above is father questionable. As the process of setting up a Foundation is just technical and pushed for to be finished in a short time, the element of being representative for thr tribe has been almost completely neglected. That is okay if it just accepts to execute special concrete projects delegated to it by the more representative organisation, but it turns out to be very contra-productive when it gets directly involved in acts that only can be handled by the recognised representative body/organisation. The one time gift looks like such a matter that in first phase only should be handled by a representative body, as the money is meant to be "at the benefit of the tribe concerned".

4.5. Setting up a representative organisation is not that easy, as it has to respect traditional patterns already in place. There are even traditional cultural constrains which have their impact on the organisational structure that can be set up. As LEMASA, also LEMASKO was meant to be set up as a representative body (based on traditional) views and structures of authority); in that way it sets LEMASA as well as LEMASKO apart from all the other pragmatic Foundations.

4.6. LEMASKO is still in a very special position. It is meant to have the same mission as LEMASA, but traditionally it is virtually impossible to fullfill that mission as in the local traditional pattern there is no element of "the whole tribe being represented by one voice". Traditionally the Kamoro people are structured in "tapura" and "marga" (as traditional owner of the land). Every 'taparu' are ordered in a kind of a hierarchy of authority. All the existing "taparu's" as a whole are just equal, and there is no traditional structure such as a "primus inter pares". So, it will be very difficult to create a simple representative body that is really recognised by all the parties involved. This all should be taken serious while looking for a good structure and process to give the Kamoro a chance to organise themselves. Now, in the haste of concluding things, the role of the Kamoro as a tribe has been minimilised to nil or less, and its traditional weakness has been used by other people to profile themselves and to be in charge of the potential benefit. In this way it only can become a source of trouble and internal division. This situation is also quite inviting for every party which would like to use the opportunity to play around with these Foundations and make them an instrument for its own goals, even political ones. The weakness of LEMASKO can be easily used by third parties to counter the strength that LEMASA is still showing.

4.7. The impact of the remarks made above perhaps become still more significant, when realised that these pragmatic Foundations will be the representatives of the tribes on the PIU (Program Implementation Unit). Anyway the quality of representation ans "broad democratic deliberations" within the PIU can be questioned for several reasons: (1) because of the -almost for sure- lack of real open and fully backed representation of the local population; (2) because of the signs already given by the local government which make clear that she is not eager to receive any critical contribution/intervention by the supporting bodies (PT Freeport) after the money has been released; this is important as in the official and original concept PT Freeport (and other supporting companies) would be represented on the board with an effective voice; (3) because of some bodies such as the church-organisations are lately not mentioned anymore as organisations that should be represented on the board; and (4) as a number of CV's (small local entrepreneurs) or "project oriented"-Foundations are already lined up to pick up the projects for implementation, and too much connections of these CV's/Foundations with representatives on the PIU are expected to have their impact (at least that is the impression).

Theo van den Broek ================================================================================

KANTOR KEUSKUPAN JAYAPURA KOTAK POS 1379 JAYAPURA 99013, INDONESIA ________________________________________________________________________________

TIMIKA-NOTES III NO. 870/TB/96/8.3. Jayapura, 30-11-1996 ________________________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

It is already more than a year since the Bishop of Jayapura's Report on Human Rights violations in and around the Timika-area has been published (August 1995) and widely spread and commented on. After that moment a number of other events have affected the same area, including the hostage-affair (Mapunduma, January 1996), the riots at Tembagapura/Timika (March 1996), the reactions by PT Freeport, the Army, the local government and local people, and finally including the erection of a new governmental administrative entity, as "Kabupaten Administratif Timika" (October 1996). Within this context questions remain: what is the situation now, are the problems solved, is there any improvement, what is really at stake, and what is everybody's gain n the whole affair? It will be difficult to answer all these questions, and I will not try to do so. On the other hand some reflection should take place and perhaps some tentative conclusions and suggestions can be made. I will just try to do that. As this reflection is also based on earlier observations contained in three papers, this paper should be read as a complementary one. It means also that I will not repeat everything that has been said in the other three papers, but just will refer to certain elements in the papers. The three previous papers are: "Coming to terms with change", revised edition, 4 February 1996; Timika Notes I" (revised), 2 June 1996; and "Timika Notes II" (revised), 14 Augustus 1996.

ANALYSIS

[01] Lack of accountability for human rights violations

It should be kept in mind that after the publication of the Human Rights report by the Bishop of Jayapura in August 1995 and the confirmation of its contents by the National Commission of Human Rights, most of the recommendations of the Commission still need to be executed. One of the six cases in the document has been followed up by further investigation by the Army, but the other cases still must be investigated and prosecutions carried out against the perpetrators of these violations. Underneath all the other events this reality plays a very important role as people are eagerly waiting to have their complaints taken care of. It is even taht important that for quite a number of local people any other development in the ares loses in weight compared with this preoccupation. By having their complaints confirmed by a national government recognised Commission for Human Rights, the local people at the end have been given the impression that their voice is really taken serious by the authorities, and they have celebrated this fact, and derived new self-confidence from it. Therefore it should not surprise anyone that a number of people feel very disappointed with the factual aftermath of the report, as too much is left unfinished.

[02] Local Government administration and PT Freeport's role

Alarmed by the report as well as by other critical input, PT Freeport has since August 1995 worked on a way to improve the situation in the area, including its own position. one of the spearheads of this improvement should be a greater involvement (and authority) of the local government in the area, which has been very clearly absent in the area over the past decades (cf. Coming to terms with change, 'Poor Administration Level"). A number of talks have taken place between PT Freeport and the government, and at the end resulted in: (a) the formulation of an "Integrated Timika Development Program" (ITD), (b) a contribution of Freeport -say: 1% of its gross revenues- to the local government's development budget, in order to execute (1) the ITD-program, and (2) some specific other programs which were already in place (scholarship, boarding facilities for school children, medical care, and skill-training). (c) the speeding up of the erection of a new and better functioning local government administration entity (Kabupatan Timika). The ITD-plan between Pt Freeport and the Government was concluded on March 7, three days before there was any rioting at Tembagapura or Timika.

[03] The Mapnduma hostage affair and its side-effect

Although the whole hostage affair which started in Mapnduma in early January 1996 and which has kept quite a number of people busy for more than months took place near the Timika area, it was an independent event with its own causes and as such it had not too much direct effect on the situation in and around Timika. However one immediate impact was the fact that a part of the release operation was co-ordinated from Timika, and within that context, an increased military presence has been built up, reaching up to 2000 personnel or more. This heavy presence has quite affected the condition of daily life in Timika and surroundings. Although the hostage affair is over (since 16 May 1996) the military presence in the area is still very obvious, and has become a more permanent part of the setting; its presence is obviously related to the security of the mining operation as the role PT Freeport's own security force has been downgraded and replaced by the newly strengthened military presence.

[04] The rioting and unanswered questions

As is widely known, some rioting has disturbed the situation in Tembagapura as well as Timika from 10 till 12 March 1996. The way the rioting has been started and executed remains the subject of story-telling, conjecture and questions. Nevertheless, some matters are clear:

the rioting was of a "limited" nature (aiming for material damage,and selective; example: the windows in the heli-hangar have been broken, but the helicopters parked on the spot have not been touched at all). the fact that security forces (police and army) have shown a very reluctant attitude to intervene, and finally no juridical processing whatsoever has taken place after the event, while some leading persons in the rioting have been invited to Jakarta to meet with high level officials in the Government and Army. The other side of the rioting is that it has sparked a process of "confrontation" with PT Freeport. One of the demands during the rioting was that Freeport's CEO, James R. Moffett (based in New Orleans, had to meet with the people. This meeting took place in Timika on 14 March 1996 under military supervision. Mr. Moffett promised to be back in Timika in another month in order to respond to the demands of the people.

[05] PT Freeport's response and the confusion

As promised MR. Moffett was back in Timika on 13 April 1996 (cf. Timika Notes I, p.1) and presented the company's offer to the local people, which later became known as the "1% offer". This element was part of a larger document (cf. Work Program of PT Freeport Indonesia Company to participate in the development of Timika Area to meet the aspiration of the peoples, 13 April 1996) but in reality only the "1% offer" has become the "talk of the day". Several remarks should be made as to this offer (more extensively analysed in Timika Notes I and II) as they are crucial to understanding subsequent developments.

First of all it should be made clear that the contribution to the local government's budget to implement the integrated Timika Development (ITD) Program was not in response to the rioting as the agreement on that contribution had been reached before there was any rioting. The only new element in the presentation of the contribution on 13 April 1996 was that the use of the money should be determined through a "community-based" decision-making process. This can be seen as an additional effort to safeguards people's participation in the whole process and in so far, as responding to the tense situation of the moment.

Secondly, it should be said that this "1% offer" never has been explained properly and clear enough for the people to understand, in line with its real setting as explained under the remark mentioned above; especially the fact that it had been decided on already on 7 March 1996. This has resulted in major confusion, as the people understood the "1% offer" a "their money" and therefore in their understanding the funds never should be handed over to the government to be handled and spent. Whether this confusion has been fueled on purpose and by whom is not clear, but what is clear is that it has led to a lot of internal division among the local people themselves (cf. Timika Notes II).

Thirdly , as the Integrated ITD-Program was already decided on early this year, PT Freeport, the Government as well as the Army were very eager to get the program started, and therefore have been seeking very actively for the explicit approval of the local people. This process has been proved being more difficult than initially thought of and facing that difficulty, the impression is that the process has been forced ahead, leaving the confusion already raised in place and adding to it.

[06] Background of filing the lawsuit

Within the process of reacting on the "1% offer", it has become clear that a segment of the local people feels that the offer can not be seen as a real answer to their more principal demands deal with: (1) the land issue, (2) the Human Rights issue, (3) the environment issue, and more general, with (4) the recognition of the indigenous people as a real partners in any talks concerning the territory they have been in charge of for so long. Based on this feeling and awareness, a lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. courts system, led by one of the local leaders, Mr. Tom Beanal. The group -consisting of various tribal entities- which is backing up the lawsuit has also refused the "1% offer", as they feel that the "1% offer" as presented can be too easily interpreted and presented on 13 April 1996 as an answer to their main demands, and they refuse that answer (cf. Timika Notes 1). This means also that their refusal of the "1% offer" can not be, therefore should not be interpreted as "a refusal of development" or as a "refusal of the government development program". This kind of misleading identification has been largely published and highlighted by parties which, either did not understand the very setting of the lawsuit, or felt their interest served well by the mentioned identification. It has also added to the overall confusion and division among the indigenous people.

[07] The people's participation concept

The eagerness by several parties to go ahead quickly with the implementation of the ITD-program (and using the 1% fund) has led to the establishment of a number of foundations which in the original concept were meant to have a representative (on tribal basis). However, reality shows that this quality is obviously absent, and the foundations in place can only be seen as pragmatically based organisations to get the project started (Cf. Timika Notes II, "Legal Organisations/Foundations and their role"). By lack of the mentioned quality the foundations are not really fitting into concept of "people's participation in the decision making process" as was meant to be achieved via the PIU (Project Implementation Unit). The setting up of this local "democratic decision-making board" has proved to be complete failure until now. The failure is not just related to the lack of the representation quality of the foundations concerned, but related as much to the usual way of working and to the perception that has been applied concretely by the local government in place. In "Timika Notes II" I have tried already to emphasize the fact that the foundations which have been set up in the aftermath of the "1% offer" do not deserve the label "representing the local tribes". I would like to stress that element once more as I consider it very crucial in the whole matter. The foundations have been set up to make the implementation of the projects-money possible. Therefore they should be given no more role, if any, than just an executive one, once more representative bodies have been formed and have set the policy. Until now, the only representative body in place is LEMASA, with all its weakness and strengths. The LEMASA's concept should be used as a model to build other representative bodies, starting with a basic reshaping of LEMASKO (the so-called representative body for the Kamoro tribe). It is common knowledge that it is a very demanding job to help to build up representative organisation of the indigenous peoples involved, but the job has to be done, and it does not make sense to take a short cut by just denying the need for those bodies. Working on this demand will need much more time than actually and currently is made available. If this means that any expansion of the mining activity has to be delayed or sacrificed for the time being, let it be so, as at the end it might confirm that any company or other party involved is really honest in looking for a sustainable and fair solution.

[08] Village- or Tribes-based development strategy

A special observation can be made regarding the use of tribal entities in the whole process. As the whole matter has been started off as a conflict between the mining company and the indigenous people claims, presented by the Amungme and Kamoro tribe, mainly represented via LEMASA (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme), almost automatically every aspect in the aftermath has been connected up with the tribal entity as the 'counterpart'. This approach might be valued as understandable as long as it deals with principal issues, such as traditional land rights, environmental damage and human rights. However it should be questioned the moment that it becomes the setting when dealing with development programs. The Integrated Timika Development Program has been launched as a plan concerning a certain area, which is the living area of a mixture of various indigenous peoples as well as people originally coming from outside the area. As a straight-forward development program it should first of all respond to local needs as they are visible in the local setting of the villages concerned, and not as a response to tribal-based issues. Therefore it should be questioned whether the connection made between use the 1% support by PT Freeport to the government-run development program and the seven tribal entities is a correct one. In my personal opinion it is not a correct one and even very disturbing.

Beyond that, by connecting the two elements, the danger for a strengthening of primordial feelings and reactions often leading to internal divisions and split off of groups has become very obvious. Nobody will be really served by that kind of a situation. To keep things in a proper perspective a clear distinction has to be made between (1) the way principal issues should be addressed (in direct relation with the tribal representatives, or really representative bodies) and (2) the implementation of an overall development plan (in direct relation to the local needs presented by the village population -whatsoever the demographic composition might be-). It should be noted as well enlarging the original issue from the only two tribes involved (Amungme and Kamoro) to seven tribes does not help to solve the issue faced. Involving all the neighboring tribes has only confused the issues at stake.

[09] Local government's role

As already mentioned, a new administrative entity has been formally established in early October 1996. This can be valued as a very important step towards a more effective role by the local government in the area. Nevertheless not too much can be expected in the short term, as (1) the newly nominated District Administrator (Bupati) is not yet on the spot (and it could take some months before he really moves to the area), (2) the general elections are coming up and will demand most of the attention of any government department during the next year, and (3) every work department must still be set up (including formulating its role and staffing it). This is all just part of a normal process. So, it might be a fair conclusion that the new administration will not be ready to function effectively - especially regarding the 'Timika problem'- before another year is over.

RECOMMENDATIONS

After making the analysis above, some suggestions should be put forward for consideration as a policy line for the next period of time, say till the end of 1997, to start with. The main goal of the re-commendations is to clear the air as much as possible and to return to a workable situation, which is the only basis for openness to a constructive dialogue. Even if this means that on certain points we have to make a U-turn, we better do so, as continuing on a line which has proved not to be promising at all can only worsen the situation.

The recommendations are as follows:

[01] the recommendations by the National Commission of Human Rights in relation to the human rights violations in the area should be implemented in order to respond to the main aspirations of the people as well as to the expectations that have been put in place by the Commission's report (see: Enclosure 1)

[02] a true understanding of the "1% support" should be looked for, stripping the concept from all its confusing elements. To do so, we recommend that it should be given the place it originally had and decided on before there was any rioting or explicit demands by the local people. That means it should be exclusively looked at as: (1) a contribution of the company to the local government's budget and its development program, as well as (2) a fund available to fulfill the mere moral obligation the company has towards the people's daily needs (including health service and such); above that this part concerns programs which were already in place before any rioting took place!

[03] the contribution made available should serve a number of purposes: implementation of ITD-program, Health Service program, Scholarship program, Local Transport program, Basic Skill Training and Local Student Boarding facilities. We would suggest that 50% -the half of the funds are de facto used for the IDT program- of the available fund should be handed over to government to implement the ITD program (and leave it up to them how handle it), while another 25% should handed over to a private foundation which -to start with- would take care of the programs in the education sector: boarding facilities, scholarship, and skill-training; and the last 25% might be best administrated by the Social Foundation of PT Freeport itself dealing with the medical program as well as the transport facilities. Both government as well as the foundations are supposed to develop their own way to process the use of the funds while keeping to the main goals as mentioned.

[04] while handling the funds available, the government as well as the foundations should direct funding to local needs and not relate exclusively to tribal entities as such. This means that in principal, programs and policies should be village-based instead of stressing the tribal aspect. Working on both levels, it might be hoped for that in the long run, and via slowly built-up intensified communication between the three bodies (government and 2 foundations) a common way of working can be developed, so at the end they can move together to the realisation of a viable shared concept of a more "people's participation" based decision-making.

[05] in line with the recommendations mentioned above, we suggest to cancel any efforts to realise the structure as has been lined out over the last months; no PIU (Project Implementation Unit) or such is opportune for the time being, and the experiences over the last months have proved sufficiently that the "ideal" structure is not yet feasible, and if pushed at this very moment, it will be very detrimental for the majority of local population. The newly nominated PCU (Program Co-ordination Unit on provincial level might be left in place in order to monitor the developments in the area and to come up with appropriate policy-lines and suggestions.

[06] putting the 1% fund where it belongs and to keep room for the special projects already in place (via special foundations) the local people will not be obliged anymore to opt for or to refuse the "1% offer". They just will rely on the government handling of a part of the money and on the free "1% offer". They just will rely on the government handling of a part of the money and on the free acceccibility to the foundations which are handling the other part.

[07] the newly formed administrative entity of the Kabupaten Timika should be given reasonable time develop and structure itself, and to get itself really familiar with the local situation and its problems, before being demanded to play a decisive role in a number of issues.

[08] special efforts have to be made to help the local people to organise themselves in representative bodies. These bodies have to be recognised as legally speaking for the local people, without being looked at as threatening bodies, and they should be given a proper and rightful place in any discussions where the body's or local people's interest is at stake.

[09] any discussion of the "agreement for additional voluntary recognition" (cf. concept of July 1996) dealing with very principal issues such as land rights, environment, operating facilities, etc. on a bilateral base between the company and the various tribes directly involved (and including the element of a tribe-based trust fund) should be put off until: a. more representative bodies are in place, and b. the outcome of the current lawsuit in the States is known (as the lawsuit is dealing with the same main issues).

[10] NGO's and other private organisations (such as church organisations) should be relied on to assist the local people, helping them to better understand what is at stake as well as to organise themselves organize to cope with the issues at hand.

Theo van den Broek

ENCLOSURE 1

In its press-release of 22 September 1995, The National Commission for Human Rights put forward the recommendations as quoted below:

# V. (...) The Commission stresses the need for the Government as well as the Army to take concrete steps to investigate the events reported, to restore discipline and to take legal actions against the persons who have been involved in the human rights violations, in order to handle the problem till finished according to the legal regulations in force. (...) investigate the situation of the 4 (four) citizens who disappeared (...)

#VI The Commission especially sees the need that the Government should give compensation to all the citizens and relatives of the victims who have experienced the violation of their rights as reported on.

# VIII (...) The Commission is of the opinion that the operational room to act between the Regional Government and the Army and PT Freeport Indonesia has to be defined very clearly so that the pattern of functional responsibility among these bodies becomes clear (...)

# IX The Commission is of the opinion that time has come to review the government's policy in handling the security problem, which already has led to a stigmatisation of a part of the citizens who are influential regarding the wholeness of the society, towards a more effective political, social and cultural approach.